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Professional Responsibility
Warren L. Mengis*
I. ATTORNEY FEES
A. Referral Fees
Prior to July 1, 1970, the effective date of the Louisiana Code of
Professional Responsibility, it was not uncommon, nor was it considered
unethical for an attorney to receive a referral fee without doing any
work or assuming any responsibility when he sent his client to another
attorney. This referral fee was normally one third of the second attor-
ney's total fee. It was understood that the fee to the client would not
be raised and thus the total cost of the referral was borne by the second
attorney. Generally there was no written contract between the two at-
torneys and in most cases the referral fee was not even discussed, simply
assumed.
The Louisiana Code of Professional Responsibility in Disciplinary
Rule 2-107 provided as follows:
A. A lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal services with another
lawyer who is not a partner in or associate of his law firm or
law office, unless
(1) The client consents to employment of the other lawyer
after a full disclosure that a division of fees will be made.
(2) The division is made in proportion to the services per-
formed and responsibilities assumed by each.
(3) The total fee of the lawyers does not clearly exceed
reasonable compensation for all legal services they rendered
the client.'
Many lawyers simply were not aware of this provision in the ethics
code and routinely continued to pay and receive referral fees where the
referring lawyer performed no work and retained no responsibility.
On the other hand, in some referral fee situations the original lawyer
continued to participate in the case and, at the conclusion of the matter,
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there was sometimes a dispute as to how the fee should be divided.
This is what happened in the leading case of McCann v. Todd.2 There
was considerable dispute in that case over whether the three attorneys
had verbally agreed on how the fee was to be split. The supreme court
concluded that although the evidence was conflicting there was no meet-
ing of the minds concerning a percentage distribution, nor was there
any agreement that the two original attorneys were employed on a
quantum meruit basis. This being so, the court concluded that the three
attorneys had undertaken a "joint adventure." Quoting at length from
Corpus Juris Secundum, the court concluded that in the absence of any
agreement or custom to the contrary, attorneys jointly undertaking to
render legal services are entitled to share equally in the compensation.
There is no mention in the entire opinion of the 1908 Canons of
Professional Ethics3 which is rather strange because Canon 34 provides:
"No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another
lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility." ' 4 The thrust
of the opinion is simply that there was a joint venture among the lawyers
and that when no definite agreement is formulated, joint venturers share
a fee proportionately.
1. The Effect of Saucier v. Hayes Dairy
The Louisiana Supreme Court decided Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Prod-
ucts, Inc.5 some eight years after the Code of Professional Responsibility
became effective. 6 It was like a bombshell on the legal community because
it held that the Code of Professional Responsibility which regulates
attorney practice has the force and effect of substantive law. As a result,
those rules override legislative acts which tend to impede or frustrate
the authority of the court. The court then concluded that regardless of
the individual contracts which the two attorneys (the first having been
discharged without cause) had entered into with the client, only one
reasonable fee could be assessed against the client, and that the two
lawyers had to divide the fee on the basis of factors which are set forth
in DR 2-1067 of the same Code of Professional Responsibility. The
court was very careful not to endorse a division of the fees between
the two attorneys on a quantum meruit basis because such a focus is
at variance with the reality of a contingent fee agreement.
2. 203 La. 631, 14 So. 2d 469 (1943).
3. Canons of Professonal Ethics, American Bar Ass'n (amended Sept. 30, 1937).
4. Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 34, American Bar Ass'n (amended Sept.
30, 1937).
5. 373 So. 2d 102 (La. 1978).
6. La. Code of Prof. Resp. (found in Articles of Incorporation, La. State Bar
Ass'n, art. 16; La. R.S. 37, ch. 4 (1987)).
7. La. R.S. 37, Ch. 4, art. 16, DR 2-106 (presently Rule 1.5(a) through (d)) (1987).
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Shortly thereafter in Leenerts Farms Inc. v. Rogers,' the court, in
abrogating a fee fixed on a promissory note, expressed its view that
the Code of Professional Responsibility is of the most exacting of laws
established for the public good, and that individuals by their contract
could not derogate from the force of such laws. In later cases, partic-
ularly Succession of Cloud9 and Succession of Wallace,'0 the court made
it abundantly clear that when an attorney enters into a contract with
his client in direct and flagrant violation of a disciplinary rule, the
contract will be considered null and void as in contravention of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. In Succession of Cloud, the court
held that the attorney had acted legally but that his contract with his
client violated Model Rule 1.8(j)" and was therefore considered null
and void.' In Succession of Wallace the supreme court held Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:2448 to be unconstitutional since it was in contra-
vention of Rule 1.16 which provides that a client can always dismiss
his attorney with or without cause."
8. 421 So. 2d 216 (La. 1982).
9. 530 So. 2d 1146 (La. 1988).
10. 574 So. 2d 348 (La. 1991).
11. La. R.S. 37, Ch. 4, rule 1.80) (1987). Rule 1.80) provides:
(j) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action
or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that
the lawyer may:
(1) Acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fee or expenses;
and
(2) Contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil
case.
12. Cloud, 530 So. 2d at 1151.
13. Wallace, 574 So. 2d at 355. Rule 1.16 provides:
(a) Except as stated in Paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client
or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation
of a client if:
(1) The representation will result in violation of the rules of professional
conduct or other law+
(2) The lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the
lawyer's ability to represent the client; or
(3) The lawyer is discharged.
(b) Except as stated in Paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing
a client if withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on
the interests of the client, or if:
(1) The client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's
services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;
(2) The client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or
fraud;
(3) A client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers
repugnant or imprudent;
(4) The client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
2. Referral Fees Today
Referral fees today are governed by Rule 1.5(e) which provides as
follows:
A division of fee between lawyers who are not in the same
firm may be made only if:
(1) The division is in proportion to the services performed
by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each
lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation;
(2) The client is advised of and does not object to the par-
ticipation of all the lawyers involved; and
(3) The total fee is reasonable.1 4
Notice the difference between the provisions of DR 2-107 and Louis-
iana's Rule 1.5(e)." Under the rules it is possible for an attorney to be
ethically entitled to share in a fee even though he does no work at all,
provided he has assumed joint responsibility for the representation in
writing 16
regarding the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning
that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled;
(5) The representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden
on the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client;
or
(6) Other good cause for withdrawal exists.
(c) When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation
notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation.
(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent-
reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable
notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering
papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance
payment of fee that has not been earned. The lawyer may retain papers relating
to the client to the extent permitted by other law.
14. La. R.S. 37, Ch. 4, art. 16, Rule 1-5(e) (1987).
15. Code of Professional Responsibility, American Bar 0 Association, Disciplinary Rule
(1969).
DR 2-107 Division of Fees Among Lawyers.
(A) A lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal services with another lawyer who
is not a partner in or associate of his law firm or law office, unless:
(1) The client consents to employment of the other lawyer after a full
disclosure that a division of fee will be made.
(2) The division is made in proportion to the services performed and
responsibility assumed by each.
(3) The total fee of the lawyer does not clearly exceed reasonable com-
pensation for all legal services they rendered the client.
(B) This Disciplinary Rule does not prohibit payment to a former partner or
associate pursuant to a separation or retirement agreement.
16. La. R.S. 37, Ch. 4, art. 16, Rule 1.5(e)(1) (1987).
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In the third circuit case of Fontenot and Mitchell v. Rozas, Manuel,
Fontenot & McGee, 7 the court held that DR 2-107 did not apply where
two law firms contested the division of a fee. One of the law firms
consisted of four partners and the other of two partners. The four-
partner firm contended that the fee should be divided by heads, and
the two-partner firm contended that the fee should be divided in half.
The court stated that DR 2-107 is aimed at full disclosure, to the client
by his attorney, that he or she has associated another lawyer who will
be sharing in the fees. This rule mandates that the client must agree
to the association and further that in such cases the division of any
fees must be proportionate to the work performed by each lawyer. But
in Fontenot the client actually hired both law firms at the beginning of
the representation and consequently there never was a situation of one
attorney associating another attorney with the consent of the client. The
court further held that quantum meruit did not apply because the client
had not discharged one of the firms. The decision of the trial court to
split the fee equally between the firms was affirmed. There was con-
siderable reliance on McCann8 and the final conclusion was that the
client had actually hired two law firms and not six individual attorneys.
The first circuit addressed the next case bearing on the subject in
Defranchesch v. Hardin.19 There, one attorney who was heavily engaged
in other matters chose to associate an attorney, Mr. Hardin, to handle
a particular case. The trial court found that both attorneys performed
work at the inception and during the early months but that later the
quantity and quality of work performed weighed heavily in favor of
Mr. Hardin. The trial court, whose opinion was adopted by the court
of appeal, found that the Saucier case did not apply and instead followed
McCann and Fontenot. The court concluded that the attorneys had
engaged in a joint venture and that the fee should be split equally
between them, regardless of the fact that Mr. Hardin's energy, ability
and enthusiasm dominated the case.
Shortly thereafter, the third circuit decided Lloyd v. Tritico.0 The
plaintiff, Lloyd, contended that he and the defendant, Tritico, had
formed a joint venture, and that by virtue of this joint representation,
he was entitled to fifty percent of the total fee. The facts of this case
were somewhat unusual in that the original attorney, Tritico, represented
the plaintiff completely through a trial on the merits resulting in judg-
ment for the defendant. Tritico then filed various motions for a new
trial or in default thereof, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
17. 425 So. 2d 259 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
18. McCann v. Todd, 203 La. 631, 14 So. 2d 469 (1943).
19. 510 So. 2d 42 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 513 So. 2d 819 (1987).
20. 527 So. 2d 57 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 528 So. 2d 154 (1988).
1993]
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Realizing that he would have to testify at these motions, he then as-
sociated Lloyd. The motions were unsuccessful, and Lloyd assisted with
brief writing for the appellate procedure. Eventually Tritico received a
fee of $650,000 out of which he paid $130,000 to Lloyd. The court
found McCann and Defranchesch inapplicable because the plaintiff was
well aware that Tritico had a policy of sharing fees on a quantum
meruit basis and implicitly accepted that arrangement. Under all of the
circumstances, the court found that the fee paid to Lloyd was fair,
adequate, and just compensation for the work he had performed.
Meanwhile, in the federal court, Judge Politz of the Fifth Circuit
was confronted with the division of an attorney fee among three lawyers,
two of whom had been discharged without cause. The court held that
awarding and approving fees is a part of the inherent power of the
court to regulate the professional conduct of attorneys appearing before
it.
In determining an appropriate fee allocation, in a matter in-
volving only the attorneys, the court must achieve an equitable
result for the officers of the court who stand before the bar
seeking a just apportionment of the earned fee. In such an
instance, niceties of contractual interpretation and technical words
of conveyances may not impede or prevent the achieving of that
just result.2
Even more to the point is Matter of P&E Boat Rentals, Inc.22 with
Judge Politz again writing for the court. In this case, the facts were
rather typical. The original attorney had minimal involvement in the
case, and the associated attorney did virtually all of the work including
the pretrial discovery, the trial, and the beginning of the appeal. Ac-
cording to the court it was clear from the record that the associated
attorney assumed total responsibility for the case, both in its factual
and legal preparation and in its financial exposure. The original attorney
claimed one-half of the fee under the joint venture theory of McCann.
The associated attorney argued that DR 2-107 applied and thus the fee
had to be divided based on the work actually performed by each attorney.
Judge Politz wrote:
In McCann the Louisiana Supreme Court used a joint venture
theory to resolve an attorney fee division dispute. Collins (orig-
inal attorney) misperceives the dispositive law. Nearly a half-
century after McCann, the Louisiana Supreme Court, which has
plenary authority over the admission and discipline of attorneys
in Louisiana, adopted the Code of Professional Responsibility
21. Seal v. Pipeline, Inc., 731 F.2d 1194, 1196 (5th Cir. 1984).
22. 928 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1991).
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to govern the conduct of attorneys within its jurisdiction. McCann
and any other previous rulings by Louisiana's highest and in-
termediate courts necessarily must yield to the Supreme Court's
subsequent exercise of its plenary authority over the subject
attorneys.
Collins further maintains that the district court erred by not
enforcing the alleged agreement between counsel for an equal
division of the fee. We do not agree. No such agreement validly
could have been made under the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility unless the attorneys equally assumed responsibility for
the matter and performed essentially equal services. The record
clearly establishes that there was neither a joint assumption of
responsibility nor equivalent performance of services. No con-
tract between counsel which is in conflict with controlling ethical
standards should be recognized and enforced by the court.23
The latest development is Scurto v. Siegrist,24 a case decided by the
first circuit. Again, the issue was the division between two attorneys of
a contingent attorney fee for the settlement of a personal injury case.
The attorney fee in question amounted to a total of $130,300. There
was an unusual twist in that the forwarding attorney claimed two-thirds
of the fee and tendered only one-third to the associated attorney. In
testimony proffered after an exclusion by the trial court, it appeared
that this had indeed been the original understanding of the parties. The
forwarding attorney was to receive two-thirds, and the associated attorney
who allegedly did most of the work was to receive one-third. The
associated attorney contended, however, that the arrangement had to
comport with DR 2-107, therefore, the legal fee had to be divided in
proportion to the value of the services furnished by each attorney. He
further contended that any division of legal fees which did not comply
with the Code of Professional Responsibility was against public policy
and unenforceable. The court did not agree with this assertion and held
that where a retained attorney associates, employs, or procures the
employment of another attorney to assist him in handling a case involving
a contingency fee, the agreement regarding division of the fee is a joint
venture which gives the parties to it the right to participate in the fund
generated when the client pays the fee. Thus, according to the court,
the suit was one for a breach of the agreement to share in the fund
resulting from the payment of the fee. The court cited and relied heavily
on Duer & Taylor v. Blanchard, Walker, O'Quin & Roberts.25 It then
concluded that "[w~hen attorneys in a Duer situation have entered into
23. Id. at 665 (emphasis added).
24. 598 So. 2d 507 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 600 So. 2d 683 (1992).
25. 354 So. 2d 192 (La. 1978).
1993]
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an agreement regarding the division of the fee, the Code of Professional
Responsibility (or Rules of Professional Conduct) does not prohibit
enforcement of that agreement and does not require apportioning of
the fee on a quantum meruit basis." 26
It is respectfully submitted that this is a misinterpretation of the
Duer decision which concerned only the question of prescription of an
action-by an attorney against another attorney who had been associated
to collect a portion of an attorney fee. There is no argument that the
action in Scurto was not one for an attorney's fee because the total
fee had been paid by the client. It is also admitted that the character-
ization of the agreement between the attorneys as a joint venture or
special partnership was correct. But the conclusion that this eliminated
the application of the Rules of Professional Responsibility was not and
cannot be correct. If it were correct, the attorneys could avoid the
application of Rule 1.5(e) by simply agreeing among themselves that the
forwarding attorney would receive one-third of the total fee even though
he performs no work and retains no responsibility. This flies in the
teeth of the holding of the Louisiana Supreme Court in Succession of
Boyenga27 wherein the court unequivocally stated that the reasonable fee
for doing nothing is nothing. Is it possible to avoid this holding in the
provisions of Rule 1.5(e) by simply stating that the attorneys are not
dividing a fee, but a fund resulting from the payment of a fee by a
client? Charles Wolfram in his text, Modern Legal Ethics, 28 has this to
say:
Both the code (DR 2-107) and the Model Rules (MR 1.5(e))
permit fee splitting among lawyers only if rather elaborate rituals
and restrictions are observed. Violations are disciplinary offenses.
In both codes the restrictions apply, however, to fee splitting
between lawyers not in the same firm; lawyers in the same firm
may share fees in any way they chose. Fee splitting between
lawyers not in the same firm is narrowly confined to worker
lawyers by the Code, but the Model Rules are more permissive
and permit some pure forwarding. As far as they go, the re-
quirements of the lawyer codes are enforced in discipline cases,
through denying effect to impermissible fee splitting arrange-
ments, and by denying fee awards to lawyers who participate
in impermissible fee splitting arrangements. 29
It seems apparent to the writer that if a lawyer is incompetent to
handle a particular type of case or too busy to handle it for one reason
26. Scurto, 598 So. 2d at 510.
27. 437 So. 2d 260 (La. 1983).
28. Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 511 (Student ed. 1986).
29. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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or the other, that he should not accept the case in the first place. If
he does accept the case, then it is the contention of the writer that he
must comply with Rule 1.5(e) and that the model rules are superimposed
upon his agreement with the associated attorney. To hold otherwise
certainly conflicts with the broad language of Succession of Wallace
wherein the court said "this court has exclusive and plenary power to
define and regulate all facets of the practice of law, including the
admission of attorneys to the bar, the professional responsibility and
conduct of lawyers, the discipline, suspension and disbarment of lawyers,
and the client-attorney relationship. '0 30
It must also be recognized that the holding in Scurto is in conflict
with Leenerts Farms, Inc. v. Rogers3' and City of Baton Rouge v.
Stauffer Chemical Co.,32 cases where the Supreme Court of Louisiana
made it crystal clear that neither a statutory provision nor a contract
between a client and his lawyer could support an attorney fee which is
unreasonable. To justify the holding in Scurto by saying that Rule 1.5(e)
is client directed is simply to ignore the history of referral fees and the
fact that the ethical rules govern the relationships between attorney-
client, attorney-court, and attorney-attorney.
B. Retainer Fees
As part of its practice guide, the ABA/BNA Lawyers Manual on
Professional Conduct advised attorneys that:
Funds belonging only in part or potentially to the lawyer, such
as advanced fees or judgement awards in which th*e lawyer has
an interest, usually must be deposited in clients' trust accounts,
and may be withdrawn only when there is an accounting and
severance of interest or when advanced fees are actually earned
by the lawyer. A minority view permits lawyers to deposit ad-
vanced fees in their personal accounts and then refund any
unearned portion at the end of the representation. 3
There was considerable confusion among attorneys concerning the
terminology which was applied to fees. Some ethics opinions referred
to "true retainers" to distinguish them from "advance on a fee for a
particular representation." Other opinions seem to indicate that even
where a fee was paid in advance for a particular representation, a certain
portion of it or a "minimum" could be non-refundable.
30. Succession of Wallace, 574 So. 2d 348, 350 (La. 1991).
31. 421 So. 2d 216 (La. 1982).
32. 500 So. 2d 397 (La. 1987).
33. ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct, § 45:101 (1989).
19931
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In 1987 the Louisiana Supreme Court in Louisiana State Bar As-
sociation v. Williams14 adopted the majority view and held that a fee
which secures the attorney's general availability to the client and which
is not related to the fee for particular representation is a true retainer
fee and may be placed in the attorney's operating account immediately.
On the other hand, an advanced fee for particular services not yet
performed constitutes funds of the client which should be placed in a
trust account and not withdrawn or withheld without the consent of
the client. This case was followed by Louisiana State Bar Association
v. Tucker" and Louisiana State Bar Association v. Fish.36 Although
these decisions were fairly well received by large law firms, lawyers
practicing by themselves or in smaller firms felt that the decisions were
unfair and unduly prejudiced them. These attorneys, along with most
attorneys who practiced criminal law, had followed the minority view.
Because of the dissatisfaction of so many Louisiana lawyers, the supreme
court, through Justice Lemmon, on November 15, 1990 appointed a
committee of Louisiana State Bar Association members to study the
advisability of amending the Louisiana Rules of Professional Respon-
sibility concerning fees paid in advance. The committee met several times
and circulated various versions of an amended rule. It was apparent
from the very first meeting that the majority of committee members
were in favor of adopting the minority rule. This rule basically meant
that if the client paid a fee for a particular representation in advance,
title to those funds should pass immediately to the attorney. He could
then place them in his operating account, subject to having to refund
all or part of the funds in the event the job was not completed or the
attorney was terminated prior to completion.
On July 8, 1992 the Supreme Court of Louisiana, considering the
recommendations of the House of Delegates which had adopted the
committee's recommendations, amended Rule 1.5 to add sub-paragraph
(f) which reads as follows:
Rule 1.5.' Fees
(f). Payment of fees in advance of services shall be subject
to the following rules:
(1) When the client pays the lawyer a fee to retain the lawyer's
general availability to the client and the fee is not related to
a particular representation, the funds become the property of
the lawyer when paid and may be placed in the lawyer's
34. 512 So. 2d 404 (La. 1987).
35. 560 So. 2d 435 (La. 1989).
36. 562 So. 2d 892 (La. 1990).
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operating account.
(2) When the client pays the lawyer all or part of a fixed
fee- or of a minimum fee for particular representation with
services to be rendered in the future, the funds become the
property of the lawyer when paid, subject to the provisions
of Rule 1.5(f)(6). Such funds need not be placed in the
lawyer's trust account, but may be placed in the lawyer's
operating account.
(3) When the client pays the lawyer an advance deposit against
fees which are to accrue in the future on an hourly or other
agreed basis, the funds remain the property of the client and
must be placed in the lawyer's trust account. The lawyer may
transfer these funds as fees are earned from the trust account
to the operating account, without further authorization from
the client for each transfer, but must render a periodic ac-
counting for these funds as is reasonable under the circum-
stances.
(4) When the client pays the lawyer an advance deposit to
be used for costs and expenses, the funds remain the property
of the client and must be placed in the lawyer's trust account.
The lawyer may expend these funds as costs and expenses
accrue, without further authorization from the client for each
expenditure. But must render a periodic accounting for these
funds as is reasonable under the circumstances.
(5) The fee under Rule 1.5(f)(1), (2), or (3) must be reasonable
under the circumstances and the contract between the lawyer
and the client regarding the fee should preferably be in writing
and should specify the basis on which fee payments are to
be made.
(6) When the client pays the lawyer a fixed fee or a minimum
fee for particular services to be rendered in the future under
Rule 1.5(f)(2) and the funds are placed in the lawyer's op-
erating account, and a fee dispute subsequently arises between
the lawyer and the client, either during the course of the
representation or at the termination of the representation, the
lawyer shall immediately refund to the client the unearned
portion of the fee, if any. If the lawyer and the client cannot
agree on the amount of unearned fee, the lawyer shall im-
mediately refund to the client, the amount if any, that the
parties agree has not been earned, and the lawyer shall deposit
into a trust account an amount which represents the portion
of the fee which is reasonably in dispute. The funds shall be
held in the trust account until the dispute is resolved and the
lawyer may not hold the disputed portion of the funds to
coerce a client into accepting the lawyer's contentions. The
19931
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lawyer should also suggest means for a prompt resolution of
the dispute such as the Louisiana State Bar Association Fee
Dispute Program or other similar arbitration.3
The above amendment became effective on September 1, 1992, and it
is believed by the writer that it will be well received by attorneys and
will not be prejudicial to the rights of clients. It should be noted that
in every instance the fee must be "reasonable" and this of course is
judged by the factors set forth in Rule 1.5(a).
One of the concessions made to those who practice in the criminal
law field where fees are generally obtained in advance was that a certain
portion of the fee could be designated as a "minimum fee" which would
essentially be non-refundable. This was in recognition of the fact that
when an attorney accepts criminal representation, he thereby excludes
himself from representing any of the other persons who might have
been caught up in the police web. If the lawyer is then discharged
without cause he certainly should be entitled to reasonable compensation
for this exclusion.
The rule provides that when the client pays all or part of a fixed
fee for particular representation, the funds become the property of the
lawyer. This means that they should not be placed into the trust account.
Accordingly, if a firm or lawyer wants to operate under the majority
view there should be a specific agreement with the client, preferably in
writing, that the funds paid in advance will remain the property of the
client until earned. The attorney could then place those funds initially
into a trust account. If he does not have this specific agreement, then
it could be concluded that the lawyer is "commingling funds" when he
places funds which belong to him exclusively into the trust account
which contains funds belonging to clients or to both clients and the
attorney together.
C. Contingency Fees in Successions
Judge Irving R. Kaufman in Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen
& Co. said that "compliance or noncompliance with canons of ethics
frequently do not involve morality or venality but differences of opinions
among honest men over the ethical propriety of conduct." 3 8 An issue
has recently come up which will surely divide attorneys and that is the
contention that charging a fee in a succession matter based upon the
gross value of the decedent's estate is unethical because the lawyer has
an apparent conflict between his duty to represent his client's interest
37. La. R.S. 37, ch. 4, art. 16, Rule 1.5(f) (1992).
38. See also Warren L. Mengis, Professional Responsibility, Developments in the
Law, 1985-1986, 47 La. L. Rev. 415, 416 (1986).
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in the valuation of the succession and its property and his own interest
in the setting of his fee. The writer believes that the contention is not
correct for two reasons. First, no matter how a fee is set, whether on
a contingent fee basis, on an hourly basis, or on a by-the-job basis,
there is always a tension between the lawyer and the client. Certainly
a lawyer who is working by the hour has no pressing desire to settle
the representation quickly, whereas his client does. A lawyer who is
charging a fixed fee certainly is inclined to complete the job as quickly
and with as little research as possible. The same is true for the lawyer
who is working on a contingent fee basis; it is certainly not to his
benefit to set "a very low contingent fee" although it would be for
the benefit of the client.
The second reason is that the fee of the attorney may be analogized
to the fee of the succession representative. Where no fee has been fixed
by the testament and none agreed upon by the heirs and legatees, the
Code of Civil Procedure fixes the fee at two and one-half percent of
the amount of the inventory. The succession representative is supposed
to include in the inventory all property of the decedent, and if there
is any question whether the property belongs to the decedent, he should
include it and let the other claimants traverse the inventory. The attorney
is supposed to be taking his instructions from the succession represen-
tative, if there is one. Perhaps even more important, the law specifically
sets out what items are to be included in a decedent's estate and what
items are to be excluded.39
It is also pertinent to note that until the minimum fee schedules
were abandoned after the Goldfarb decision, 4 these schedules all pro-
vided that the minimum fee in handling a succession was determined
by a percentage of the gross value of the decedent's estate. The writer
does not believe that most attorneys who handled successions in those
days had any belief that they had any control over what went into the
succession or what was left out of the inventory. It is certainly true,
however, that if this mechanical application of a percentage results in
a fee which is unreasonable, then it should be reduced. On the other
hand, if this application of a percentage results in a fee which is
unreasonably small, then it should be increased. It does not seem that
the use of the percentage is unethical, but the charging of an unrea-
sonable fee under the circumstances would be. Finally, it might be
pointed-out that Rule 1.5(a)(4) states that the amount involved is one
of the factors in calculating a reasonable fee, ergo, small estate, small
fee; large estate, large fee, even though the time to settle both successions
might be comparable.
39. See, e.g., La. R.S. 47:2404 (1990); La. Civ. Code art. 1505; La. R.S. 9:2354,
2372 (1991).
40. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 95 S. Ct. 2004 (1975).
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II. MALPRACTICE
A. The Lima Decision
Lima v. Schmidt" involved attorney malpractice and prescription.
In June of 1983, the attorney overlooked a $150,000 collateral mortgage
while doing a title examination. His clients, the Limas, were not aware
of the mistake until a bank began foreclosure in July of 1985. The
attorney continued to represent the Limas and hired another attorney
to defend the foreclosure. This was unsuccessful and in June or August
of 1987 the Limas obtained a new attorney. In August of 1987, the
defendant attorney wrote the former clients that he was negotiating with
the bank for the repurchase of the property and cancellation of the
note. In January of 1988, the defendant attorney again wrote his former
clients that it was his intent to return the Limas to the position they
would have been had he not overlooked the mortgage. This suit was
filed in November of 1988, some five years after the error was committed.
Both the lower courts upheld an exception of prescription. The supreme
court reversed, finding that contra non valentum principles prevented
the running of prescription until the second lawyer was hired. The two
letters were acknowledgments of the obligation and each interrupted
prescription so that the suit was timely filed.
This case is extremely important because it held that no intent to
interrupt the prescription is necessary and that the acknowledgment may
be made on an informal basis. The court specifically overruled Marathon
Insurance Co. v. Warner42 which had held that it was necessary for the
obligor to have the intent of interrupting prescription in ordinary ob-
ligations as well as delictual actions even though the intent principle
had been developed in connection with mineral servitudes. Summarizing
the jurisprudential principles relied upon, the supreme court stated:
A renunciation of prescription is an abandonment of the right
derived from prescription that has accrued and is subject to
stringent proof requirements. An acknowledgement is a simple
admission of liability resulting in the interruption of prescription
that has commenced to run, but not accrued, and may be made
on an informal basis.43
The facts of Lima arose prior to the enactment of Louisiana- Revised
Statutes 9:56054 which sets up one and three year peremptive periods
41. 595 So. 2d 624 (La. 1992).
42. 244 So. 2d 353 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971).
43. Lima, 595 So. 2d at 634.
44. La. R.S. 9:5605 (1990).
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for legal malpractice as pointed out in footnote 1 of the decision. 4
Interestingly enough, in view of B. Swirsky and Co. v. Bott,4 the
supreme court also discussed the rule that malpractice is ordinarily
governed by a one year prescriptive period with two limited exceptions:
(1) When the attorney expressly warrants a specific result and fails to
obtain the result; and (2) when the attorney agrees to perform certain
work and does nothing whatsoever. 4
In Swirsky, the plaintiff hired the defendant and his firm to present
a fire loss claim against the insurance companies which had provided
coverage. In spite of repeated requests, the defendant never filed a proof
of claim nor did he take any other action. He asserted that his failure
to act was based upon the client's failure to pay delinquent legal fees
from prior representation. The fire loss claim prescribed. This suit was
subsequently filed, but more than two years after the prescription had
accrued. Plaintiff contended that the malpractice claim had not pre-
scribed because the attorney did nothing whatsoever and therefore the
prescriptive period was ten years. The court held that the "do nothing
whatsoever" is a form of breach of guaranty or warranty to obtain a
particular result and not a separate exception to the rule that a one
year tort prescription governs legal malpractice. The court then concluded
that the attorney did not expressly warrant any result and therefore the
claim had prescribed. With all due respect, the writer believes that the
Swirsky decision is patently wrong. As the court stated in Cherokee
Restaurant, Inc. v. Pierson:4
A malpractice action against an attorney will now normally be
subject to the one year prescriptive period of La. Civ. Code
Art. 3536. However, when an attorney expressly warrants a
particular result, i.e., guarantees winning a law suit, guarantees
title to property, guarantees or warrants the ultimate legal effect
of his work product, or agrees to perform certain work and
does nothing whatsoever, then clearly there would be an action
in contract and the ten year prescriptive period of La. Civ.
Code Art. 3544 would apply. 49
Nothing in the later cases would suggest that the "do nothing" and
the "warranty" are necessarily connected.
B. The Hartwick Decision
It is not unusual for lawyers to share office space, libraries, and
even secretarial help and not be partners. However, it appears to be
45. Lima, 595 So. 2d at 628.
46. 598 So. 2d 1281 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 605 So. 2d 1149 (1992).
47. Lima, 595 So. 2d at 628 n.2.
48. 428 So. 2d 995 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
49. Id. at 999.
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fairly common for such attorneys to combine their names on letterheads
and even on office doors, in the telephone directory, etc. This is a clear
violation of the model rules because Rule 7.5(d) clearly provides that
"[l]awyers may state or imply that they practice in a partnership or
other organization only when that is the fact." 50 Comment (2) under
Rule 7.5 says: "With regard to paragraph (d), lawyers sharing office
facilities, but who are not in fact partners, may not denominate them-
selves as, for example, 'Smith & Jones,' for that title suggests partnership
in the practice of law." ' 5' The problem arises when one of the attorneys
commits some negligent act and suddenly all the attorneys listed in the
letterhead find themselves as defendants in a malpractice action.
Such was the case in the recent decision of Hartwick v. Hartley.52
Although the attorney who was allegedly negligent was not listed in the
various names on the letterhead, he wrote letters on the "firm" letter-
head, and the plaintiff at all times believed that the attorney was an
employee of the firm. In upholding a motion for summary judgment
on behalf of the other attorneys, the court relied on Gravois v. New
England Insurance Co.53 In Gravois the court found that no partnership
by estoppel existed even though the two attorneys' names were on the
letterhead, were listed as the law firm of Wegmann and Longenecker
in the telephone directory as well as the Martindale Hubbell Legal
Directory, and even though they had obtained professional malpractice
insurance together.
Admittedly, if Gravois is correct, then Hartwick is also correct.
However, the writer agrees with the concurring opinion of Chief Judge
Schott in Hartwick wherein he stated: "[W]hen a law firm permits an
individual practitioner to hold himself out as a member of the firm the
principals of that firm should have some responsibility to the client who
suffers a loss because of the attorney's malpractice. '5 4 Of course, the
model rules have never been adopted in Louisiana as malpractice stan-
dards, but it does seem unfair to the client who thinks he or she is
dealing with a firm and finds out ultimately that only one individual
lawyer is responsible.
50. Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct (2d ed.), American Bar Ass'n
Rule 7.5.
51. Id.
52. 598 So. 2d 1241 (La. App. 4th Cir.), rev'd, 604 So. 2d 957 (1992).
53. 553 So. 2d 1034 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989).
54. Hartwick, 598 So. 2d at 1244.
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